Between Scylla and Charybdis? Twenty-Five Years Administrating the Contested Region of Brussels by O'Connor, Karl & Vaesen, Joost
 
 
1Ulster University, Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland 
2Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium 
 




Between Scylla and 
Charybdis? Twenty-Five Years 
Administrating the Contested 
Region of Brussels 
Karl O’Connor1 and Joost Vaesen2 
Abstract 
Although Belgian politics has experienced numerous political conflicts in the post-war period, 
the Brussels political system has, since 1989, remained relatively stable. This has led some 
scholars to suggest that Brussels may be experiencing a depolarization of its traditional 
linguistic cleavages. In this article, we analyze the possible realignment of these divisions 
and the possible emergence of an identity based on the urban territory. We trace the 
development of the public administrations at sub-state level in Brussels post 1989 and add 
new data on the often neglected elite-level bureaucrats and their individual attachment 
perceptions. This topic is most relevant as the organization and functioning of the public 
administrations have proven to be one of the major politically and socially divisive issues of 
the power-sharing agreement. The article draws on published and unpublished documents 
and interviews with 20 elite-level bureaucrats from four distinct public administrations 
operating in Brussels. The findings suggest that a regional urban attachment is emerging 
among the bureaucratic elite; however, this attachment would not prove robust if either 
community were to feel threatened. The likelihood of unintended policy making, which would 
have unintended consequences, is quite high given that the bureaucratic elite do not have 
confidence in the administrative structures of the city. The findings should be of interest to 
those interested in identification perceptions and to those studying other more fragile 
environments in and around Europe’s borders that may one day consider adopting the 
Brussels approach to conflict management. 
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Introduction: The Traditional Cleavages Dividing the Belgian and 
Brussels Political System 
Many cities within and around Europe’s borders could be described as divided 
along ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages. Some cases such as Belfast, 
Mostar, Nicosia, and Brussels, however, differentiate themselves in that the 
legitimacy of the state authority within which they are situated is contested. 
Dumper (2011) has, therefore, argued that “[d]ivided cities within contested 
states should be seen as a category of cities in their own right” (p. 671). The 
case of Belgium, and more particularly that of Brussels, is consequentially of 
interest. Currently, Brussels is the only officially bilingual region in Belgium. 
The Flemish north of the country is unilingual Dutch-speaking and the 
Walloon south of the country is unilingual French-speaking, whereas the fourth 
linguistic region, the unilingual German-speaking region, is often neglected in 
studies on politico-linguistic conflict in Belgium. Furthermore, Brussels has 
been in the eye of the political federalization storm since the very beginning of 
the reshaping of the Belgian State. Post 1945, language has been the primary 
political cleavage dividing Belgians, and bilingual Brussels serves as a nexus 
between the largely Dutch-speaking north (Flanders) and the principally 
French-speaking south (Wallonia). In this article, we investigate whether 
traditional political cleavages are becoming depolarized and in turn are giving 
way to new attachments and hence new political oppositions. 
Regional Identities 
Fitjar (2010) investigated three hypotheses examining variation in regional 
identities. His first hypothesis proposed that levels of regional identity would be 
higher in regions where the spoken language is different from that which is 
dominant in the state as a whole. The second investigated whether levels of 
regional identity would be higher in regions with a history of political 
independence or autonomy, whereas the final hypothesis correlated foreign 
immigration with an increase in people’s propensity to identify with their regions. 
Using Fitjar’s study as a point of departure, this article investigates the extent to 
which an urban identity exists in Brussels. This idea of achieving peace through 
altering identity perceptions is not new in and of itself. With reference to Northern 
Ireland, Byrne (1995) has explored the idea that “in time, a . . . regional identity, 
allied to a European supranational identity may transcend the notion of an obsolete 
national identity as the concept of the nation state peters out” (p. 15). This was 
explored further in his later study where he concluded that a regional identity 
“could serve . . . to erode the geopolitical and psychological border between 
Northern and southern Ireland” (Byrne, 2001, p. 342). However, generating such 
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regional attachments within contested environments is not straightforward. Kerr’s 
(2006) research, again in Northern Ireland, found, “it has proved impossible to 
build a syncretistic intercommunal or national identity . . . that could overarch and 
supersede ethno national allegiance” (p. 16). Furthermore, Nagle and Clancy 
(2012), again looking at Northern Ireland, write, “We argue that there are limits to 
the extent that ethnicity can be reconstructed into shared identities” (p. 78). 
Therefore, whereas Fitjar was interested in determining the cause of allegiance 
shift, we are most concerned with determining whether an allegiance shift is taking 
place: We investigate whether the traditional Belgian cleavages are being redrawn. 
To this end, we investigate the following hypothesis: An urban “Brussels” 
attachment supersedes a primary linguistic attachment within the region. To test 
our hypothesis, we concentrate on the attachment perceptions of just one section 
of society: the elite-level bureaucrat. Apart from being our area of expertise, the 
governance mechanisms of Brussels receive scant scholarly attention. 
Furthermore, focusing on the public administration will significantly contribute to 
our parallel aim of understanding how contested societies can be successfully 
governed (see Deschouwer, 2009; Renard, Vaesen, Voets, & Verjans, 2011, for an 
overview of the governing structures of Belgium and Brussels). If other contested 
societies are to learn from the Brussels experience, assessing the organization and 
functioning of the Brussels public administrations is fundamental to understand 
how the Brussels consociational model works (see Witte et al., 1999). Moreover, 
as we demonstrate in the sections below, the linguistic organization and language 
use of the bureaucratic machinery have proven to be one of the most politically and 
socially divisive issues in Belgium generally, and most particularly in Brussels. 
Case Selection 
Brussels proves an ideal place to situate our research question as the 
environment would tend to encourage the rejection of our hypothesis. Hepburn 
(2011) correlates decentralization with an increase in regional citizenship. 
Although she is more interested in determining who is perceived to belong or 
not to belong to this region, we investigate her underlying assumption that 
regional citizenship increases with decentralization. Using an ethno-politically 
contested society where traditional cleavages are most strong should lead to 
the rejection of our hypothesis. Brussels is, therefore, an example of what 
Eckstein (1975, p. 118) would have called a crucial case of the most likely case 
variety: If traditional ethno-political cleavages (French vs. Dutch language) are 
to supersede a capital-region divide (Brussels vs. Flanders/Wallonia), they are 
most likely to do so in Brussels. 
Research Question 
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To test our hypothesis, we have formulated a number of questions: What are 
the politico-linguistic perceptions of the elite-level bureaucrat within the city 
today? To what extent do elite-level bureaucrats identify with the city over (a) 
their language groups and (b) their language territories? These questions refer 
to the governance of Brussels and especially the compromise between self-rule 
(autonomy for Brussels politicians) and shared rule (Brussels functioning as a 
bridge between the north and the south and thus featuring the dominance from 
Flemish and Walloon politicians reducing autonomy for Brussels politicians; 
Hooghe, 1993). Third, we ask, can a territory-based government form the basis 
of a cohesive identity within a contested environment, superseding traditional 
linguistic attachments? As we start with the premise that identity guides 
behavior, we are interested to determine whether these elite-level bureaucrats 
identify themselves along the traditional Belgian cleavages (French and 
Dutch), or have developed new attachments. 
Background to the City 
Assessing the realignment of the traditional cleavages, we have to take into account 
at least two major transitions affecting the Brussels contextual situation. The first 
important shift was the major process of federalization of the former Belgian 
unitary state. This completely overhauled the governance structure of both Brussels 
(Vaesen, 2008) and the entire Belgian state (John, 2004, p. 173). In 1989, it led to 
the establishment of sub-state-level actors of which the (officially bilingual) 
Brussels Capital Region (BCR) became the most important player in Brussels 
(Vaesen, 2008). The second transition has seen the sociolinguistic demographics 
of Brussels change dramatically. Globalization, and its inherent migratory 
(multilingual) waves, has affected the sociolinguistic demographic of the small 
global city of Brussels (Janssens, 2013). The context of the politico-linguistic 
cleavages has shifted in two most notable ways in recent decades. First of all, the 
position of Dutch vis-à-vis French was strengthened due to the economic and 
political resurgence of Flanders. Second, the internationalization of Brussels has 
altered the sociological composition of the city, thereby turning the preponderant 
bilingual city into a multilingual environment (Janssens, 2013; Witte & Van 
Velthoven, 2010, pp. 197-198). The most recent data on population background in 
Brussels demonstrated the immigrant population of Brussels to be 46% 
(Deboosere, Eggerickx, Van Hecke, & Wayens, 2009), although ongoing 
international immigration has most likely now pushed this far beyond the 50% 
threshold. Unilingual citizens in Brussels are restricted to some 5% Dutch speakers 
and some 34% of French speakers, thus implying the presence of some 14% 
bilinguals (combining French and Dutch) and some 47% of other bi/multilinguals 
or allophones (2012 Data, regarding language use in the family of origin: 
Janssens, 2013). 
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Figure 1. N of questions and interpellations in the assembly/parliament of the Brussels Capital 
Region regarding linguistic issues in the administrations, per linguistic group (1990-
2010).DU=Dutch; FR=French 
The Importance of the Public Administration in the Brussels 
Political Arena 
Before analyzing the perceptions of the Brussels bureaucrats vis-à-vis the 
traditional politico-linguistic cleavage, this section situates our hypothesis 
within the politico-administrative environment, reinforcing the view that the 
environment within which our hypothesis is set would tend to favor rejection 
of the hypothesis. That administrative language use still matters among the 
political elite is obvious from Figure 1, which displays the number of questions 
and interpellations in the assembly/parliament of the BCR (1990-2010) 
referring to language issues in combination with administrations selected on 
the basis of the subject.1 From the total volume of parliamentary questions and 
interpellations on language issues, 48% referred explicitly to different aspects 
of the administrations (43.5% for the Dutch linguistic group and 49.6% for the 
French linguistic group). 
The relevance of this issue is clear, because it provoked the only systemic 
crisis within the Brussels Regional political arena. After the resignation of 
State Secretary Vic Anciaux (Volksunie–VU) following disagreement over the 
linguistic partition of civil servants in certain public services (such as the Fire 
Department) in November, 1997, consensus could not be reached within the 
Dutch language group: Two blocks, each with 5 seats in the assembly of the 
BCR remained opposed to each other. Referring to “force majeure” and given 
O’Connor and Vaesen 6 
 
the fact that the Regional assembly is a so-called legislature parliament that 
cannot be dissolved easily, the Executive of the BCR continued to govern until 
the following regional elections in 1999, thereby breaching the political 
compromise (Vanleemputten, 2003, p. 50). This brings us to the crux of the 
issue: The political conflict concerning the so-called Linguistic Courtesy 
Agreement, and the systemic crisis it implied, proved to be an exception in the 
Brussels political arena. This does not imply that tensions are absent, but in 
general, the politico-linguistic polarization within the Brussels political model 
diminished after the conclusion of the third State Reforms of 1988/1989 
(Delcamp, 1993). The high political tensions and conflicts within the Brussels 
political arena mainly apply to the situation before 1988/1989. Since then, a 
depolarization of the traditional politico-linguistic cleavage has been evident. 
As Peter John (2004) suggested, the devolution process linked to the 
federalization program in Belgium did imply a diminishing of some political 
tensions, demonstrating the positive result of federalization without the 
instability that would have resulted from generating separate political arenas. 
The impact of this depolarization process was such that some observers refer 
to a burgeoning Brussels identity, overcoming the linguistic divide. However, 
a (possible) paradox can also be detected: After the third State Reform (1988-
1989), the political-linguistic tensions in Brussels have diminished, but the 
capital now faces the danger of being framed between the competing interests 
of Flanders and Wallonia (De Coorebyter, 2005, p. 12). In summary, although 
a Brussels identity may indeed be evident, an overview of parliamentary 
questions and interpellations, together with an understanding of the reasons 
behind the only systemic governance crisis (the linguistic repartition of 
bureaucrats in the Brussels regional administration in 1997), suggests that the 
design and functioning of the public administration remain a topic of 
contestation. The public administration remains, therefore, a site of particular 
interest when looking at questions of conflict management. 
Institutional Structure 
The actual administrative design is very complex. To meet the demands by 
Dutch-speaking politicians in Flanders regarding the increase of (sub-state) 
autonomy in cultural and educational matters, so-called “Communities” were 
established. The quest for devolution of economic policies, as pressed for by 
politicians in Wallonia, resulted in the establishment of “Regions” (Witte, 
Craeybeckx, & Meynen, 2009). These sub-state actors are restricted to specific 
territories, but one key feature is that these territories do overlap (Deschouwer, 
2009). There are not two or three constituent political units for the Belgian 
State but six sub-state actors: three Communities (the Dutch-speaking, the 
French-speaking, and German-speaking Community) and three Regions 
(Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels). This institutional fragmentation is 
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especially obvious in the case of Brussels, mirroring the debate regarding the 
statute of the Belgian capital and the dichotomy between shared rule and self-
rule (see Hooghe, 1993). The BCR administration is responsible for matters 
such as economic and employment policies, public transport, local 
government, and so on, reflecting a self-rule by Brussels politicians. The 
cultural and educational affairs in Brussels are split up along two Communities 
(mirroring a shared rule with Flanders and Wallonia): the Flemish Community 
and the French Community. Both have a specific extension in Brussels (with 
specific competences), labeled “Community Commissions,” namely, the 
Flemish Community Commission (VGC) for the former and the French 
Community Commission (COCOF) for the latter. To deal with some bilingual 
matters such as public hospitals, a bilingual Joint Community Commission 
(COCOM/GGC) was also established. To make it even more complex, 
asymmetry has become a further feature of this design (Witte, 1992): The 
French Community Commission was granted legislative power in certain 
competencies in the early 1990s, whereas its Dutch-speaking counterpart was 
not. Furthermore, the Dutch-speaking Flemish Region and the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish Community, which also incorporates cultural matters in bilingual 
Brussels, have merged in practice.2 In conclusion, a plethora of political units 
are active in Brussels, leading it to be described as a splintered city (De 
Bruycker, 1999, p. 465) and provides an example of power sharing at the 
lowest common denominator (O’Connor, 2014). 
Method 
The attachment perceptions of elite-level bureaucrats have been scrutinized 
using semi-structured interviews. At the political cabinet level, preliminary 
interviews were conducted with six politically appointed directors from four 
ministerial cabinets. Three further scoping interviews were also conducted 
with three of the primary stakeholders involved in the development of the 
Brussels Cultural Plan (2007) because the latter was one of the first initiatives 
to establish cross-cutting cooperation in the field of the so-called personal and 
cultural competences in Brussels (see Nassaux, 2011). These interviews 
contributed to the design of the questionnaire and assisted in the selection of 
candidates. At the administrative level, face to face interviews were conducted 
with 20 elite-level bureaucrats within the sub-state administrations, namely, 6 
directors within the Flemish Community Commission (VGC), 4 directors 
within the French Community Commission (COCOF), 4 directors within the 
Joint Community Commission (COCOM), and 3 directors within the BCR 
administration. As a number of directors within the BCR administration 
declined to participate, three senior managers were also interviewed.3 
Interviews took place between March and May, 2010, and were given on 
condition of anonymity. Although there are indeed further public 
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administrations operating within the city, they were not incorporated into the 
research design as their competencies extended beyond the city boundaries, 
and they were not exclusively responsive to the Brussels political structures. 
Interviews usually took place within officials’ offices, but occasionally took 
place at a neutral venue. Interviews lasted an average of 90 min, occasionally 
running to 2 hr. A semi-structured format was used for the interviews, 
incorporating a number of open questions to allow respondents to have 
maximum input into the data-collection process. The sample represents more 
than 80% of elite-level occupied positions from the COCOM, VGC, and 
COCOF administrations.4 All of those targeted for interview within these 
administrations agreed to participate in the research. The vast majority of 
bureaucrat interviewees (80%) were male. Nine were educated through Dutch, 
10 were educated through French, and 1 was educated through English. 
Interviewees were asked whether they perceived themselves to belong to the 
“Dutch-speaking community,” “to the French-speaking community,” or to 
both communities. Eight respondents felt attached to each of the French and 
Dutch communities, whereas four respondents felt equally attached to both 
communities. This triangulation of data from questionnaires, interviews with 
both political cabinets (n = 6), and targeted elite-level bureaucrats (n = 20), 
together with secondary documents, ensures the robustness of our findings. 
The Findings 
First and foremost, we can say that a Brussels regional attachment is 
demonstrated among elite-level bureaucrats. When we asked elite-level 
bureaucrats about their attachments, responses indicated a shift away from the 
traditional community attachments. Respondents were asked to rank their 
(ethno-cultural) identification using the following categories5: Belgian, 
Flemish, Walloon, Dutch-speaking, French-speaking, Brussels, and European. 
Most respondents identified three levels of attachment. The responses are 
outlined in Figure 2. The various identification categories are on the y axis, 
whereas the extent to which these attachments were attributed first, second, 
and third preferences is depicted on the x axis. 
As demonstrated by the graph above, identification with the traditional cleavages—
Dutch/Flanders versus French/Wallonia—is surpassed by a Belgian state identity. No 
respondent placed Wallonia within his or her first three attachment preferences. However, of 
note to our study is the high number of respondents identifying with Brussels. Does this 
suggest a burgeoning Brussels, urban identity? Although indeed respondents may identify first 
with their country (10) or their language community (4—3 French-speaking, 1 Dutch-speaking) 
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or with their territory (3), 12 of our 20 
 
Figure 2. Nationality preferences 
respondents ranked Brussels within their top 3 attachments. These results 
coincide with the overall results of the identification attachments of the Brussels 
population, based on a quinquennial representative survey. Indeed, the categories 
provoking the most positive identification in the first place proved to be “Brussels” 
(30.6%) or a “Brussels municipality” (23.5%) followed by “Belgian” (16.8%). The 
identification with one of the two traditional languages comprised (in the first 
place6) only 5.0% of the French-speaking Brussels inhabitants and 1.4% for Dutch-
speaking Brussels inhabitants. Flemish and Walloon received equally low scores 
(2012 Data, Janssens, 2013, p. 107). Results for each of these categories vary 
between surveys; however, the preference for territorial identification (based on 
the city or municipality) over linguistic identification remains stable. The elite 
bureaucrats, therefore, do not dissociate from the general population of the city. 
Numerous respondents demonstrated this urban/territorial attachment: “Flanders 
doesn’t know Brussels any more . . . People in Flanders think Brussels is very 
dangerous—like Chicago. They don’t have an image of the reality of Brussels” 
(Interviewee 2). Further interviewees commented, “Brussels works . . . it is outside 
that there is a problem” (Interviewee 16). “It is still important that Dutch culture is 
respected, but we are different from those in Flanders” (Interviewee 20):There is 
a change in the town: people now speak Dutch in the shops too; The 
problem in Brussels is that the two language communities have too much 
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This further substantiates our contention that an affiliation with the city exists 
among elite-level bureaucrats; and further, that this exists in opposition to a 
traditional ethno-political identity. 
Although such a high level of attachment is significant, it must nonetheless be 
stressed that an emerging Brussels identity among elite bureaucrats is found to exist 
simultaneously with other attachments and, although often superseding a language 
community identity, rarely supersedes a state affiliation. Only one of the seven 
respondents who identified a language community as their primary attachment 
gave a second preference to a Brussels identity. At the same time, 7 of the 10 
respondents identifying themselves as Belgian in the first instance identified with 
the city in the second instance. This too raises an interesting point—although a 
Flanders identity may compete directly with a Brussels identity or a Belgian 
identity, a Brussels identity appears to exist in communion with a Belgian identity 
(probably related to the capital function of Brussels). 
To delve further into these ethno-cultural preferences, we asked interviewees to 
identify on a Likert-type scale their attachment levels to the urban government 
(namely, a territorial rather than linguistic identification). The findings are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. The first table identifies attachment to the urban 
government by language group and the second by each of the sub–national level 
administrations. It is found that a significant number of respondents do not identify 
with an urban government. That is the case not only for the bureaucrats of the 
monolingual COCOF and VGC administrations but also for the bilingual BCR and 
COCOM. The latter is especially interesting because both institutions function with 
a bilingual status, which would be more likely to match a common, territorial vision 
(surpassing the traditional linguistic divide). Also of note is the finding that 
members of the French-speaking COCOF are least likely to feel attached to the 
(bilingual) territorial urban government. This may suggest a frustration among 
French-speaking bureaucrats with the recruitment process/compromises within the 
bilingual authorities. 
In terms of attachment to the urban government by ethno-cultural 
markers/identity, a Brussels identification did not correspond with an 
attachment to the Brussels (regional) institutions. Of the nine respondents 
identifying with Brussels in either a first or second instance (Figure 2), six felt 
attached to the urban government whereas three did not. This would tend to 
lend support to the hypothesis that the institutions of Brussels do not represent 
those bureaucrats identifying with Brussels. This view is compounded in that 
only two interviewees thought that the involvement of the political structures 
in running their department was constructive. As presented in Table 3, the 
governance solution in Brussels has the confidence of neither those identifying 
with Brussels nor those identifying with the language communities. It reflects 
one of the challenges  
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Table 1. Attachment to Urban Government by Language Group. 
 Dutch-speaking French-speaking Both languages 
Feel attached or very attached to 
the Brussels urban 
government 5 2 2 
Feel not very attached or not at 
all attached to the Brussels 
urban government 3 6 2 
Table 2. Attachment to Urban Government by Institution. 
 BCR CCC COCOF VGC 
Feel attached or very attached to the 
Brussels urban government 4 2 0 3 
Feel not very attached or not at all attached 
to the Brussels urban government 3 2 4 2 
Note. BCR = Brussels Capital Region; CCC= Common Community Commission; COCOF = French 
Community Commission; VGC = Flemish Community Commission. 
Table 3. How Constructive Are the Political Structures to the Running of Your Department? 
Value  Number of responses 
Not at all constructive 13 
Not constructive 3 
Fairly constructive 1 
Very constructive 1 
Missing 2 
of the current politico-institutional model in Brussels: Although it 
successfully defused the political conflict within the Brussels arena, the 
creation of separate political sub-arenas inhibited the development of a 
common vision for the city/region. There has been no provision for inter-
institutional cooperation at elite bureaucrat level: In line with most 
interviewees, Interviewee 20 remarked, “There is never any institutional 
contact.” This is remarkable given the accumulation of political mandates 
among representatives, implying that the same political personnel populate the 
aforementioned sub-state-level institutions in Brussels (cf. Swenden & Brans, 
2006). This frustration with the operation of government in the city was 
highlighted by numerous interviewees: “If you want to build a cycle lane across 
three communes it takes years to get agreement (Interviewee 1); “The 
institutional design is too complicated” (Interviewee 2); In some instances we 
share school sites but have two completely separate administrations—in the 
cafeteria for example we buy Dutch speaking tomatoes and they buy French 
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speaking tomatoes . . . In the botanical gardens in Meise, the ground is Flemish 
but the trees and flowers are bilingual. (Interviewee 6) 
Some interviewees highlighted the dangers posed through lack of cooperation: 
“At the moment, we have three regulatory regimes for nursing homes—we 
could see a race to bottom” (Interviewee 11); “We have three community 
governments in Brussels doing the same job: even building hospitals” 
(Interviewee 14). Multiple interviewees referenced the crisis in education 
where there exists a need to build schools in immigrant areas: As education is 
a Community government competency, neither the Dutch- nor French-
speaking community governments are willing to fund education projects for 
what they see is for those outside their constituencies. 
At the same time, we also noted a desire among the administration for an 
increase in cooperation: “I want increased interaction with other players in the 
city—our administration is just one piece of the jigsaw” (Interviewee 1). “The 
only way to get this done is through collaboration—you can do what you can 
do with your department, but the key word if you want to succeed is 
collaboration” (Interviewee 2). “The institutional arrangement would work 
better if we could do more things together—for a start, why can we not 
cooperate with the GGC/CCC?” (Interviewee 4). “We can learn from GGC and 
COCOF they understand the Brussels situation too . . . the procedures that work 
etc.” (Interviewee 5). “We never have contact with other administrations . . . I 
would love to: Our Flemish colleagues have the same problems, how do they 
solve the solutions . . .?” (Interviewee 8); “There should be a platform where 
people meet” (Interviewee 14). 
However, at the same time, the bureaucratic elite were found to have trust 
and confidence in their ministers (16), other elite-level bureaucrats in other 
departments (14), and elite-level bureaucrats within their own departments 
(13). This would suggest that the weaknesses in the model are indeed structural 
(or institution-based), not personal. So far, we have seen that there is a 
burgeoning Brussels identity among the bureaucratic elite. However, at the 
same time, we see a frustration with the existing governance structures. 
We decided to probe further the idea that some elite-level bureaucrats have 
adopted a Brussels (territorial) identity in place of a (mono)linguistic identity, 
and try to determine the extent to which this identity would guide behavior. To 
do this, we drew on the active representation element of representative 
bureaucracy theory. To create the environment most likely for a bureaucrat to 
actively represent his or her primary identity, two criteria have been put 
forward: There must be a critical mass of that primary identity, and the issue 
must be of importance to the group expected to actively represent (Keiser, 
Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Meier & O’Toole, 2006). In Brussels, 
recruitment quotas ensure that a critical mass of each “community” is 
represented among the bureaucratic elite when it comes to the officially 
bilingual institutions (although each monolingual institution has a pendant in 
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the other official language as well). Furthermore, the sacrificing of the merit 
principle in favor of linguistic quotas for recruitment is an issue of intense 
political sensitivity as demonstrated by Figure 1. 
Looking at bureaucratic perceptions of the merit principle, it would be expected 
that Dutch-speaking bureaucrats would be in favor of maintaining the ethno-
linguistic quotas and that French-speaking bureaucrats would be in favor of 
scrapping them. In Table 4, we find in line with these hypothesized expectations 
that Dutch speakers tend to be in favor of quota representation whereas French 
speakers tend to favor the merit principle. Indicative findings, therefore, suggest 
that in instances where a language could be threatened, primary linguistic 
attachments would come to the fore. Thus, although a territorial identity is indeed 
emerging, and many elite-level bureaucrats identify with the city region of Brussels 
over their language groups, if their language were to come under threat, a 
resurgence in linguistic attachments would be expected. These positions are further 
substantiated by qualitative remarks from both French and Dutch speakers. These 
range from the majority more reserved responses, 
“The 50:50/70:30 recruitment doesn’t fit with the socio synergy of the city” 
(Interviewee 2 FR); “I am in favour of sacrificing the merit principle we are in a 
bilingual region there must be equilibrium between both communities” 
(Interviewee 9DU); “Sacrificing the merit principle is the price of peace, but I 
disagree with it” (Interviewee 19FR); “If we protect the French minority at the 
national level we must protect the Flemish language at the regional level” 
(Interviewee 10FR). 
to the more extreme, 
“I didn’t get a job because it was protected for a Flemish person. They have their 
rights protected we don’t need to sacrifice the merit principle any more” 
(Interviewee 10FR); “The merit principle should be sacrificed as French speakers 
in general don’t speak Dutch” (Interviewee 17DU); “You can’t have 50:50 
recruitment in the long term there are more and more French people in this city—
I don’t see this city as a bilingual city—it is a French speaking city. Quotas are 
necessary for Brussels to guarantee Dutch representation but not 50%” 
(Interviewee 11FR). 
Concerns expressed by the bureaucratic elite about the functioning of the 
Brussels power-sharing structures must therefore be addressed. Otherwise, 
decisions emanating from these governance structures could have unintended 
consequences, jeopardizing the extensive progress that has been made within 
the region over the past 25 years. 
Table 4. Sacrificing the Merit Principle Is Necessary for Good Governance Within the 
Contested City. 
 Agree Disagree 
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Dutch 7 3 
French 2 5 
Both 2 0 
 
Implications of the Findings 
The potential causes of this burgeoning Brussels territorial rather than cultural 
mono-linguistic attachment seem to be multiple. First of all, the establishment 
of definitive sub-state institutions in Brussels in 1989 involved the direct 
election of the assembly of the BCR, 6 years before its counterparts in Flanders 
and Wallonia. When looking at the careers (see Stolz, 2003) of Brussels’ 
politicians, one notices a so-called “integrated pattern,” with a substantial 
number of politicians moving up and down between sub-state and state 
assemblies. However, overtime, most of Brussels’ municipal burgomasters 
moved toward the assembly of the BCR, because the latter institution became 
the reference government for the local governmental layer in the capital. As 
such, from the second legislature on, 11 or 12 out of the 19 burgomasters were 
present and even holding important mandates in this sub-state Parliament 
(Vaesen, 2008). This finding is very relevant because the office of commune 
burgomaster holds a lot of popular esteem and political power, and in the past, 
it was seen by some politicians as a preferred position over that of Minister of 
State Secretary in the Government of the BCR (Delcamp, 1993). It reflects a 
certain localism in the Brussels regional arena. It is clear that these new, full-
term Brussels institutions displayed a particular attraction for political elites 
over national and community governments. This is also the case in the north 
and the south of the country (see Renard et al., 2011). In any case, the 
Government of the BCR from the start adopted a policy based on a holistic, 
integrated approach to Brussels. This implied that programs that could be 
situated in the gray zone of partition of competences between the Region, 
Communities and Community Commissions in Brussels, that the BCR 
Government would step in and provide the service, thereby using the autonomy 
of the local governmental layer. 
In a second phase, the BCR started to integrate the Community 
Commissions as well (it involves the same political personnel due to the 
accumulation of political mandates), thus provoking tensions with their parent 
bodies: the French-speaking community and the Flemish-speaking community 
(Vaesen, 2008). This alignment of the Community Commissions to the BCR 
thus threatens to undermine the partition of competences and so the political 
compromise regarding the political-institutional architecture of Brussels. This 
realignment on a Brussels urban or territorial identity, rather than on 
linguistic markers does not imply however that the debate regarding 
cultural identity and its political recuperation in Brussels is over. Some 
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politicians and certain media in the capital do continue to underline that 
Brussels is a French-speaking city. In this political discourse, it is alleged 
that 93% of the citizens in the capital are French-speaking, thus reducing 
the potential impact of the “Flemish” sphere in Brussels to a tiny minority 
of 7%. However, such simplistic political statements do not coincide with 
the sociolinguistic reality, which is far more complex given the 
bilingualism or multilingualism of 61% of the Brussels citizens (see 
Janssens & Vaesen, 2015). 
Furthermore, the role of the so-called cultural field in Brussels cannot be 
underestimated. Governance of educational and most cultural affairs is 
linguistically divided between the Flemish and French Communities in 
Brussels. However, in spite of this governance arrangement, some cultural 
institutions in Brussels have developed cross-cultural, bi/multilingual 
instruments. The BCR (responsibility for economics, employment, transport, 
trade, etc.) capitalizes on this evolution by supporting cultural initiatives (for 
which it is stricto sensu not competent) from budgets such as the image 
building budget, which is to support the trade and commercial environment of 
Brussels. Finally, the contribution of civil society associations (e.g., the cross-
cultural “Cultural Plan for Brussels”), universities, and research institutions to 
the public debate cannot be neglected (see Mincke, Hubert, Vossen, & De 
Corte, 2011; Nassaux, 2011). 
This article further substantiates claims previously presented by Fitjar 
(2010) and Hepburn (2011) suggesting that regional identities can supersede, 
and sometimes even usurp, traditional ethno-political affiliations. Drawing on 
a case where such secondary identities are least likely to emerge pushes this 
hypothesis to the limits. Although we only test this in relation to one section of 
society—the bureaucratic elite—we argue that this section of society is a 
significant partner in the governance of society, particularly that of Brussels. 
It is, therefore, worthy of research in its own right. The findings complement 
existing sociological research in Brussels, demonstrating that a Brussels urban 
identity is indeed evident. However, the findings also suggest that when the 
urban identity hypothesis is pushed to its limits, primary attachments do 
reemerge. 
The implications of the research for political science are that regional 
identities, even in the most unlikely environments can supersede traditional 
ethno-political cleavages. If it is accepted that identity guides behavior, 
these identity perceptions shape how the bureaucrat can skew the 
implementation and design of public policy. The research also has 
implications for conflict management research, demonstrating that ethno-
political cleavages can be altered and can do so within a short period of 
time. Although it is (currently) unlikely for Dutch-speaking inhabitants of 
Brussels to completely disassociate themselves with the Dutch-speaking 
people or with the region of Flanders and adopt a French-speaking 
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attachment, it is possible that a regional urban identity could emerge, 
superseding these traditional cleavages. In contrast with historical 
processes of Frenchification of Dutch-speaking inhabitants in Brussels, the 
current context has changed dramatically. Dutch has become not only a 
valuable asset to the Brussels labor market, but the sociodemographic 
composition of the city has also been altered significantly due to substantial 
rise in immigration. Today, more than 50% of the Brussels population do 
not have roots in the traditional linguistic divide. In response to these 
existing realities, some political actors have pushed for more regional 
autonomy (using the bilingual BCR as a vehicle) while many civil society 
actors have pleaded for cross-cultural cooperation in those domains, which 
remain fragmented in monolingual systems such as culture and education. 
Further research is required into this (re)emerging Brussels identity: Do the 
language groups interpret what it means to be an inhabitant of Brussels 
differently, and furthermore, does a socioeconomic divide exist? What is 
clear is that a population of the Brussels elite identify with Brussels. 
Further research is required to determine how exactly this identity is 
interpreted. 
Our findings do not suggest that a homogeneous Brussels identity exists, 
nor do they suggest a common cultural vision for the city. Nonetheless, 
they do show that traditional linguistic cleavages are no longer the primary 
attachment of a significant proportion of bureaucrats. A Brussels identity 
is evident. Where it exists, it supersedes the traditional linguistic cleavages. 
However, these linguistic cleavages have not been completely eradicated. 
The evidence presented would suggest that if either community were to feel 
threatened, a resurgence in the linguistic cleavages would be likely. The 
significance of the findings is twofold. For Brussels, and indeed the wider 
Belgian contestation, the institutions of the region must respond to those 
possessing a Brussels attachment, not simply those with a Dutch-speaking 
or French-speaking attachment. Whereas previous studies have suggested 
that there may be a burgeoning Brussels identity, this study identifies that 
at the heart of the governance institutions, this identity also exists. The 
Brussels power-sharing solution, although proving itself to be politically 
durable amid a state environment that remains volatile, does not have the 
confidence of the elite-level bureaucrat. Although there is widespread trust 
and confidence in the actors themselves, there is widespread dissatisfaction 
with the governance structures of Brussels. The governance structures of 
Brussels, although proving successful in managing traditional politico-
linguistic divisions, are less conducive to “good” coherent governance. 
These frustrations are evident among the bureaucratic elite. If these 
decision-making structures are maintained, it is not unlikely that they will 
produce poor decisions that would have unintended consequences. This 
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research has demonstrated that attachment to an urban identity, although it 
exists, would be threatened if either community felt threatened. 
Furthermore, the evidence tends to support the assertions made elsewhere 
(O’Connor, 2014) that the governance structures of Brussels are not 
sustainable if the city is to move from conflict management to conflict 
resolution. The weakness is not in that of the individuals, as there is a high 
degree of confidence among the bureaucratic elite in their colleagues, their 
departments, and their political masters, but in the structures. Second, and more 
importantly for the study of conflict management, this finding demonstrates 
that although national tensions between the traditionally divided communities 
may remain high, or indeed may even be intensifying (Flemish nationalist 
parties continue to gather support in Flanders), a simultaneous increase in an 
urban identity is also apparent. 
Finally, although the institutional design of Brussels has managed the 
conflict, it is now evident that it is not capable of managing the conflict 
management to conflict resolution process. The bureaucratic elite are stuck 
between Scylla and Charybdis in that they want to implement “good” public 
policy and would like to cooperate with their counterparts in other 
administrations (O’Connor, 2014); the political level (in Brussels) also wishes 
to cooperate (Vaesen, 2008); however, the institutional design imposed on the 
city does not facilitate such cooperation beyond the existing instruments of the 
cooperative federalism model. 
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Notes 
1. This selection method obviously gives only a rough indication of the number of 
interventions regarding this issue, because it does not take into account the actual 
discussions. The selected questions and interpellations refer explicitly to linguistic 
issues in the administrations. 
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2. However, the Constitution does not recognize this merging as it necessitates a 
majority vote on the French-speaking side as well. 
3. The Brussels Capital Region (BCR) figure is disappointing as six of those targeted 
for interview declined to participate. However, given the nature of the study, it is 
more important to have representative samples from the Community Commission 
administrations as primary identities would be expected to be stronger in these 
institutions. Furthermore, the Community Commission administrations are all 
functioning in the Brussels city area but are all directly or indirectly linked with 
the monolingual Communities whose main locus of power is situated in Flanders 
and Wallonia. 
4. A number of positions within the Joint Community Commission (COCOM) and 
French Community Commission (COCOF) were vacant at the time of fieldwork. 
5. The same categories (together with other categories) are used in the standardized 
scientific survey regarding language use, identity, and identification in Brussels. 
Of the ethno-cultural markers race, religion, and language, only the latter is of 
importance (see Janssens, 2013). 
6. When it comes to the issue of identity and identification, the survey actually 
contains three aspects: positive identification in the first place, positive 
identification in the second place, and finally negative identification (“with which 
categories do you not want to be identified”). Furthermore, distinctions are made 
between traditional French speakers, Dutch speakers, traditional bilinguals, and 
“new” bilinguals (see Janssens, 2013). 
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